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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 The African diaspora is increasingly viewed as a key to realizing the development 
potential of international migration.1 At the same time, there remains considerable confusion 
about who exactly constitutes the diaspora and which groups should be targeted for “diaspora 
engagement.”2 For some, the diaspora consists of all migrants of African birth living outside 
Africa. The African Union’s definition of the African diaspora, for example, “comprises people 
of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality.”3 
The World Bank goes a step further to distinguish between an involuntary and a voluntary, a 
historical and a contemporary, component of the diaspora: “Over four million voluntary 
immigrants of African origin reside in the West. This ‘voluntary’ Diaspora is distinct from the 
vastly larger ‘involuntary’ Diaspora that populates North America, Europe, the Caribbean, and 
Brazil. On matters of African development, however, the interests of both groups often 
intersect.”4 
 
1.2 Despite differences of emphasis, most definitions of the African diaspora in the migration 
and development literature agree on two things. First, the African diaspora is located outside the 
continent, usually in several different countries or regions but primarily in the North. Second, 
membership of the African diaspora is predicated on an interest or involvement in African 
development. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki, for example, conveyed both 
messages when he argued at the 2007 African Ministerial Diaspora Conference that “there is an 
urgent need for knowledge sharing and economic cooperation between Africa and the 
Diaspora.”5 The African Union similarly notes that members of the Diaspora must be “willing to 
contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union.”6 
 
1.3 Clearly, the African Union and African governments have little interest in engaging with 
those who have turned their backs on Africa for a new life elsewhere. From that standpoint, a 
definition of the diaspora that demands actual or potential engagement in African development 
makes perfect sense. What does not make sense is the idea that diaspora individuals and groups 
are located exclusively outside Africa. Perhaps, as Bakewell notes, this is not surprising for 
“these tend to be wealthier, better-educated and more organized groups” with easier access to 
donor and African government officials and business groups across the globe.7 This may well be 
true, but it is also elitist, ignoring the much larger number of ordinary migrants whose “hidden” 
contributions to development go largely uncelebrated and unrecorded (except perhaps in 
aggregate remittance statistics). There is no reason why the African diaspora should not include 
all migrants who maintain links with Africa, and the many migrants from Africa who live and 
work in other African countries.8 
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1.4 This paper argues for a spatially inclusive definition of the African diaspora that 
encompasses all migrants of African origin wherever they live so long as they are outside their 
country of origin. This would include people of African origin (not just first-generation migrants) 
resident in the North, in the South and, crucially, in Africa itself. There are, in other words, 
African diasporas outside Africa and African diasporas within Africa, and the two are often 
closely connected. Accordingly, this paper: 
 
(a)  Discusses the development rationale for a revised definition of the African diaspora, 
which encompasses African migrants living in other countries within the continent 
(b) Discusses the case of South Africa, which is a major African migrant country of origin 
and destination 
(c)  Compares the African diaspora in South Africa and the South African diaspora outside 
South Africa 
(d) Reflects on the general relevance of the South African case study for our understanding 
of the role of the diaspora in African development. 
  
2.0  Diasporas of the South 
2.1 The migration and development debate initially tended to imply that the only stream of 
relevance to African development was migration from South to North.9 One line of analysis 
argued that the North should encourage economic development in origin countries to reduce the 
pressure for out-migration from regions such as Africa.10 Another sought to encourage (skills) 
migration from the South to the North while simultaneously avoiding charges of promoting a 
debilitating “brain drain” by emphasizing the positive diaspora feedback mechanisms of out-
migration (remittances, investment, knowledge transfers, and so on).11 China and India are held 
up as exemplars of diaspora-fed development.12 The curious feature of this debate is that it 
ignores the long-standing reality that South-South migration is numerically more important than 
South-North migration and continues to grow in volume and economic importance.13 
 
2.2 At an aggregate level, South-South migration has generated an estimated 45 percent of 
the current global migrant stock compared to only 37 percent for South-North migration (Table 
1). There is considerable uncertainty about how to configure South-South migration within the 
global migration-development debate.14 By tacking on the activities of migrants in the North to 
other North-South “development” linkages, (for example, by constructing graphs comparing 
flows of remittances with aid flows and foreign direct investment), the emphasis on South-North 
linkages is maintained. Ironically, the sizable contribution of South-South remittances—
estimated at 30 percent of the total — is usually “hidden” in aggregated global flows.15 
 
Table 1: Cumulative Global Migration Flows, 2005  
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 Destination 
Origin North South 
North 25 million 14% 8 million 4% 
South 64 million 37% 87 million 45% 
Source: Calculated from Global Migrant Origin Database v4 Updated March 2007; 
http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/Global_Migrant_Origin_Database_Version_4.xls 
 
2.3 While there is growing awareness of the role of South-South migration in development, 
the term “diaspora” is rarely used in this new literature. In their pathbreaking analysis of South-
South migration and remittances, for example, Ratha and Shaw use the term only once, to refer 
to the dispersal of African groups within the interior of Southern Africa in the 19th century.16 
The irony of this use of the term to describe the movement of people within Africa will not be 
lost on those who agree with the fundamental premise of this paper. There is thus a need to 
develop a conversation between the new literature on South-South migration and the growing 
analysis of diaspora engagement with Africa. 
 
2.4 Bakewell notes that “African diasporas within Africa are absent from the picture” of 
migration and development. There are five basic reasons why the definition of the African 
diaspora should be expanded to include migrants who have relocated to other countries within 
Africa.17 First, consistent with the general argument made above about South-South migration, 
Africa itself is the most important destination for African migrants. The Sussex University 
Global Migrant Origin Database v4 figures for global migrant stock indicate that the main 
destinations for African migrants are Africa itself (13 million or 53 percent of the total), Europe 
(7.3 million or 30 percent), the Middle East (2.6 million or 10 percent), and North America (1.2 
million or 5 percent) (Table 2). Nearly two-thirds of African migration is to countries of the 
South. In total, 53 percent of African migrants live in Africa and 47 percent live outside the 
continent. 
 
Table 2: Global African Migrant Stock by Region  
 Number Percent 
NORTH   
    Europe 7,337,542 29.4 
    North America 1,239,722 5.0 
    Australasia 223,095 0.9 
Subtotal 8,800,359 35.3 
SOUTH   
    Africa 13,181,759 52.8 
    Middle East 2,595,856 10.4 
    Asia 339,014 1.3 
    Latin America 58,273 0.2 
Subtotal 16,174,902 64.7 
TOTAL 24,975,261 100.0 
Source: Calculated from Global Migrant Origin Database v4 Updated March 2007; 
http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/Global_Migrant_Origin_Database_Version_4.xls 
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2.5 Secondly, with the exception of forced migration movements, the majority of migration 
within Africa is developmental in nature, motivated by the search for better economic 
opportunity and building sustainable livelihoods at home (often at the microscale of households 
and communities). Migrants are driven by the desire to obtain the resources (financial and 
otherwise) to reduce poverty and to ensure a better standard of living for their dependents, 
including children. They also generally maintain much stronger social and economic ties with 
home than those who have left the continent. Circular migration is fast becoming a new 
“development mantra” in the North.18 Within Africa, however, circular migration has been the 
dominant form of migration for decades. If diaspora engagement is defined by actual or potential 
involvement in the development of countries of origin, then most African migrants in Africa are 
already fully engaged. 
 
2.6 Thirdly, another new “mantra” in the migration-development debate is the idea of 
“codevelopment.” African diasporas within Africa are clear agents of “codevelopment,” 
contributing to the development of origin and destination countries. Their contribution to 
countries of destination is often downplayed or minimized; migrants are rarely seen as a 
development resource in African countries of destination. More often they are viewed as a threat 
to the interests of citizens, as takers of jobs, bringers of crime, consumers of scarce resources, 
and drainers of wealth. Across the global South, the activities of migrants are increasingly and 
often misleadingly viewed as antithetical to development.19 The xenophobic violence that rocked 
South Africa in May 2008 and left 64 people dead and scores injured was accompanied by a 
bellicose antiforeign rhetoric that blamed migrants for many of South Africa’s social and 
economic ills and ignored the contribution of migrants to South Africa’s own development.20 
 
2.7 Fourthly, members of the African diaspora in Africa are often closely networked 
personally and economically with the diaspora outside Africa. These economic linkages are 
particularly intense in the case of globalized trading networks such as those run by Senegalese 
and Somalians. Zimbabweans living in the United Kingdom are often referred to as a “diaspora” 
while those in South Africa are generally not.21 Yet both send large sums in remittances back to 
Zimbabwe, sometimes to the same household. There is no logic to why remittances from 
Zimbabweans in Europe are designated a “diaspora” contribution while those from South Africa 
are not. More generally, to ignore the African diaspora in Africa is to exclude over half of all 
African migrants as potential participants in, and beneficiaries of, diaspora policy initiatives. 
 
2.8 Finally, “elitist” definitions of the African diaspora tend to focus on the development 
contributions of the highly skilled, educated, and networked members of diasporas in the North. 
This is highly problematic since it excludes many ordinary development actors who have 
migrated out of Africa. It has the added disadvantage of excluding African migrants in Africa on 
the grounds that most are supposedly unskilled and have low earning power. This is a dangerous 
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assumption since it excludes, by definition, the development contribution of such migrants and 
many highly skilled, educated, and networked Africans who do live and work in other countries 
in Africa.
 
3.0  South Africa’s Two Diasporas 
South Africa is a country of significant in-migration and out-migration. Prior to 1994, 
immigration easily exceeded emigration. After 1994, legal immigration fell while emigration 
continued to grow. Since 2000, both have increased sharply (Figure 1). Official statistics 
significantly undercount both emigration and immigration, but the trends shown are generally 
illustrative of postapartheid migration movements. Together, these flows have created, a growing 
African diaspora within South Africa, a sizable South African diaspora outside the continent, and 
a smaller South African diaspora within Africa. This chapter focuses on the first two of these 
diasporas: the African diaspora within South Africa and the South African diaspora outside 
Africa. 
3.1 The African Diaspora within South Africa 
 
3.1.1 South Africa’s migrant stock was just over 1 million in 2001 (Table 3). Of these, 23 
percent were from Europe (a legacy of apartheid-era immigration) and 72 percent were from 
Africa.22 The 2001 South African Census recorded 730,000 foreign-born African migrants from 
54 different African countries. However, the vast majority were from other states within the 
Southern African Development Community (95 percent). Of these, 39 percent were from 
Mozambique, 19 percent were from Zimbabwe, 17 percent were from Lesotho, 5 percent were 
from Namibia, and 4 percent were from Swaziland (Table 4). Around 20,000 migrants were from 
East Africa, 16,000 were from West Africa, and 4,500 were from North Africa. Since 2001, the 
number of migrants from Zimbabwe, in particular, has increased markedly.23 
 
Figure 1: Official Levels of Migration, South Africa, 1990–2002 
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Source: Unpublished data from Statistics South Africa.  
 
 
Table 3: Migrant Stock in South Africa, 2001 
Region of Origin Number Percent 
NORTH 
    Europe 236,000 23.0 
    North America 9,000 1.0 
    Australasia 4,000 0.5 
    Subtotal 249,000 24.5 
SOUTH 
    Africa 729,498 71.5 
    Asia 27,000 3.0 
    Middle East 6,000 0.5 
    Latin America 13,000 1.0 
Subtotal 776,000 76.0 
TOTAL 1025000 100.0 
Source: Unpublished Data from Statistics South Africa; 2001 Census.  
 
 
Table 4:  SADC Countries of Origin of Migrants to South Africa, 2001 
Country of Migrant Origin Number Percent 
Mozambique 269,669 39.2 
Zimbabwe 131,887 19.2 
Lesotho 114,941 16.7 
Namibia 38,148 5.5 
Swaziland  28,278 4.1 
Zambia 20,770 3.0 
Malawi 19,673 2.9 
Botswana 14,955 2.2 
9 | P a g e  
 
Angola 9,937 1.4 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 3,772 0.5 
Tanzania  3,330 0.5 
Mauritius  2,577 0.4 
Other 191 <0.1 
Total 687,899 100.0 
Source: Unpublished Date from Statistics South Africa; 2001 Census.  
 
 
3.1.2 There is actually considerable uncertainty about the current number of African migrants 
in South Africa. The 2001 South African Census recorded 690,000 other Southern African 
Development Community-born migrants. The Sussex University Global Migrant Origin 
Database v424 has an almost identical total but a totally different distribution by country of origin 
(with Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo combined increasing from 16,000 to 
300,000), Mozambique falling by 120,000, Lesotho by 107,000, and Zimbabwe by 73,000 
(Table 5). 
 
3.1.3 The latest World Bank estimates confuse the situation still further, increasing Lesotho by 
200,000, Mozambique by 120,000, and Zimbabwe by 451,000. The World Bank total is 1.1 
million but records no migrants at all from key sending countries such as Angola, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Namibia. Official estimates of the number of irregular 
migrants in South Africa bear no relationship to any of these estimates, varying between 4 
million and 10 million (with the number of Zimbabweans usually put at 2 million to 3 million). 
None of these estimates have any basis in fact and are likely highly exaggerated. One study used 
2001 South Africa Census data and projections from date of entry by a large migrant sample in 
Johannesburg, and estimated that there were 900,000 Zimbabweans in South Africa in 2007.25  
 
 
Table 5: Variable Estimates of Southern African Development Community Migrant Stock in South 
Africa 
Country of Origin 2001 South Africa 
Census 
Democratic Republic  
of Congo (Version 4) 
World Bank 
Angola 11,806 152,057 0 
Botswana 17,819 2,989 24,849 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 4,541 149,462 0 
Lesotho 114,941 8,246 208,226 
Madagascar 220 316 0 
Malawi 25,090 26,568 10,662 
Mauritius 3,500 32,149 0 
Mozambique 269,669 150,369 269,918 
Namibia 46,225 4,215 0 
Seychelles 257 3,144 0 
Swaziland 34,471 2,007 80,593 
Tanzania 3,923 52,554 0 
Zambia 23,550 44,809 0 
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Zimbabwe 131,887 59,109 510,084 
TOTAL 687,899 687,994 1,104,331 
Source: Statistics South Africa, Global Migrant Origin Database v4, World Bank. 
 
3.1.4 Unpublished data from Statistics South Africa for the 2001 Census allow the construction 
of a general profile of the African diaspora in South Africa at that time (Table 6). The Census 
showed that 80 percent of the African-born migrant stock was black and 20 percent was white 
(primarily immigrants from ex-settler colonies such as Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe). The migrant stock is also male dominated, although the feminization of migration is 
proceeding rapidly.26 In 2001, approximately 64 percent of the migrant stock was male and 36 
percent was female. The Census also reveals that far from being an undifferentiated, unskilled, 
and marginalized group of migrants, there is considerable variety in the skill levels and earnings 
of African migrants in South Africa. For example, only a quarter of the migrants were in 
unskilled (“elementary”) occupations. Just as many were in skilled and professional positions, 
and 45 percent were doing semiskilled jobs. 
 
Table 6: Demographic Profile of African Diaspora in South Africa, 2001 
 Number Percent 
Race/Sex 
Black Male 380,866 53.5 
Black Female 188,484 26.5 
Subtotal 569,350 80.0 
White Male 68,144 9.6 
White Female 74,265 10.4 
Subtotal 142,409 20.0 
TOTAL 711,759 100.0 
Occupation 
Skilled   
Senior Managers/Officials 21,991 6.6 
Professionals 28,021 8.4 
Technical 21,582 6.5 
Farmers 12,087 3.6 
SUBTOTAL 83,681 25.1 
Semiskilled   
Plant/Machine Operators 26,625 8.0 
Crafts and Trades 66,638 20.0 
Clerical 21,824 6.5 
Services 33,682 10.1 
SUBTOTAL 148,769 44.6 
Unskilled   
Elementary Occupations 82,244 24.6 
Other 19,167 5.8 
TOTAL 333,861 100.0 
Income Bracket Number Percent Cumulative % 
R1–R400  81,412 19.6 19.6 
R401–R800 70,375 17.0 36.6 
R801–R1,600 94,996 22.9 59.5 
R1,601–R3,200 70,447 17.0 76.5 
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R3,201–R6,400 39,734 9.5 86.0 
R6,401–R12,800 31,079 7.5 93.5 
R12,801–R25,600 16,923 4.1 97.6 
R25,601–R51,200 6,227 1.5 99.1 
R51,201–R100,240 1,979 0.5 99.6 
R100,241–R200,480 1,097 0.3 99.9 
>R200,480 595 0.1 100.0 
TOTAL 413,874 100.0  
Source: Unpublished Data from Statistics South Africa.  
Note: R = Rands. 
 
 
3.1.5 The income range of migrants was also considerable. Of those earning an income, 60 
percent earned less than R18,000 a year in 2001 and 86 percent less than R72,000 a year. Less 
than 1 percent earned more than R250,000 a year. In part, the low overall earnings are a function 
of the low rates of remuneration for most unskilled and semiskilled positions in South Africa. 
Rates of pay for skilled and professional migrants are higher but still do not compare with those 
in Europe or North America. Many poorer households, however, supplement their income 
through informal sector activity, which is generally not reflected in the Census data. Also, many 
migrants are unable to get jobs commensurate with their qualifications and experience and end 
up working in lower-paid jobs. 
 
3.2 The South African Diaspora outside Africa 
 
3.2.1 The collection of systematic comparative data for the South African diaspora outside 
Africa is in progress by the Southern African Migration Programme. The precise number of 
South African emigrants is unknown because official South African emigration statistics are 
known to undercount the flow by as much as two-thirds.27 Destination-country immigration 
statistics are more reliable, but they do not always record departures, so census data need to be 
used to provide a more accurate picture of cumulative migration. The Global Migrant Origin 
Database v4 suggests that Europe is a major location of South African migrant stocks (at 244,000 
or 40 percent of the total) (Table 7). The main countries of destination are the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, and Germany. Other important regions of destination include North America 
(18 percent of the total) and Australasia (each at 18 percent). In other words, three-quarters of 
South Africans abroad live in the North. The large number of South Africans recorded as living 
in other African countries (especially Mozambique and Zimbabwe) is almost certainly incorrect. 
 
3.2.2 The South African diaspora outside Africa is therefore located mainly in countries with 
historical immigration ties to South Africa (Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United 
Kingdom) and newer destinations (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) 
(Table 8). Migration to all of these destinations continues in considerable numbers. In the case of 
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Australia, for example, the 2006 Census shows that 4,000 to 6,000 migrants entered from South 
Africa each year from 2001 to 2006, adding to the 22,000 who arrived in the immediate 
postapartheid period (between 1995 and 2000) and the 40,000 who moved there during the 
apartheid period. The 2006 New Zealand Census shows that 3,000 to 4,000 migrants arrive from 
South Africa each year. In this country, too, there was a postapartheid surge (14,000 between 
1996 and 2001) of migration from South Africa. 
 
 Table 7: Regional Distribution of South African Diaspora 
Region Number Percent 
NORTH 
    Europe 243,716 40 
    North America 108,221 18 
    Australasia 105,721 18 
Subtotal 457,658 76 
SOUTH 
    Africa 302,764 20 
    Asia 14,042 2 
    Middle East 9,500 1.5 
    Latin America 2,305 0.5 
Subtotal 328,613 24 
TOTAL 786,721 100 
Source: Calculated from Global Migrant Origin Database v4 Updated March 2007; 
http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/Global_Migrant_Origin_Database_Version_4.xls 
 
Table 8: Major Countries of South African Diaspora 
 Numbers 
United Kingdom 142,416 
Australia*   104,120 
United States 70,465 
Canada 37,681 
Germany 34,674 
New Zealand*  26,069 
Netherlands 11,286 
Portugal 11,197 
Source: Calculated from Global Migrant Origin Database v4 Updated March 2007; 
http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/Global_Migrant_Origin_Database_Version_4.xls 
Note: *Updated for 2006 Census. 
 
3.2.3 Out-migration from South Africa occurred in three distinct phases: 
 
(a) Pre-1990 (primarily migrants, exiles, and refugees of all races leaving apartheid South 
Africa): Emigration spiked during periods of political unrest (such as in the 1960s after 
the Sharpeville massacre, in the 1970s after the Soweto Uprising, and during the state of 
emergency in the 1980s). Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom were primary 
destinations during this period. 
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(b) 1990–2000: Departure of many conservative whites who were not prepared to live under 
a democratic African National Congress government and objected to the loss of historical 
white privileges. Most of these migrants went to Australia and the United Kingdom, but 
the numbers moving to New Zealand increased sharply. 
(c) Post-2000: Growing migration of skilled people and professionals of all races pushed by 
concerns about crime and safety and attracted by the more open immigration policies of 
skills-seeking Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. 
 
As Table 9 shows, annual immigration to Canada has remained reasonably constant, but there 
has been a major increase in the rate of migration to Australia and New Zealand. 
 
Table 9: Phases of South African Immigration to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 
 Australia Canada New Zealand 
 Number 
Average 
per year Number 
Average 
per year Number 
Average 
per year 
Pre-1990 38,860 — 19,505 — 2,877* — 
1991–2000 29,202 2,920 12,790 1,297 19,668** 1,311 
2001–2006 32,723 6,544 6,795 1,160 18,273 3,655 
Source: 2006 Census. 
Note: — = not available 
* Pre-1986. 
**1986–2000. 
 
3.2.4 The emigration potential of skilled South Africans still in the country remains extremely 
high. In a survey of health professionals in South Africa, SAMP found that 50 percent of all 
health professionals had given a “great deal” of consideration to leaving the country and 30 
percent expected to be gone in five years.28 According to every social and economic measure 
(except collegiality), there were more dissatisfied than satisfied professionals, and the “Most 
Likely Destination” rated more highly than South Africa. The Most Likely Destinations were 
Australia and New Zealand (33 percent), the United Kingdom (25 percent), the United States (10 
percent), Europe (9 percent), and Canada (7 percent). Nearly 40 percent of professionals had 
“often” been contacted by a recruitment agency in South Africa and 25 percent were “personally 
approached” about working abroad.29 
 
3.2.5 Most South African emigration consists of families rather than individuals and the gender 
split is very even in the diaspora. In Australia, for example, there were 51,037 male and 53,095 
female South African migrants at the time of the 2006 Census. The age profile of South Africans 
in New Zealand shows that a quarter of South African migrants were under age 20 in 2006, again 
an indication of extensive and recent family unit migration. The largest adult group (40 percent) 
was people in their 30s and 40s, presumably their economically active parents.  
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3.2.6 A precise occupational breakdown of the South African diaspora has yet to be compiled, 
but it is known that many migrants enter countries of destination under skilled immigration 
categories.30 Rates of unemployment are also extremely low in the diaspora. In Australia, for 
example, 35,115 male South Africans and 29,663 females were employed in 2006 (and only 
1,329 working-age males and 1,424 working-age females were unemployed). Data for the health 
profession suggests that this is one of the major professions for migrants in destination countries, 
where South African medical school qualifications are generally recognized (Table 10). The 
United Kingdom (27.5 percent of the total) has been the major destination for South African 
physicians followed by the United States (27 percent) and Canada (21 percent). Nurse migration 
is also dominated by the United Kingdom (49 percent), followed by Australia (19 percent) and 
the United States (14 percent). The United Kingdom is even more important as a destination for 
South African dentists (68 percent) and pharmacists (42 percent). 
 
Table 10: Health Professionals in the South African Diaspora, Circa 2000 
OECD 
Country Doctors Nurses Dentists Pharmacists 
Australia 1,111 15.1 1,083 18.6 152 12.0 23 15.9 
Austria 13 0.2 16 0.3 2 0.1 0 0.0 
Canada 1,545 21.0 280 4.8 60 4.7 15 10.3 
Switzerland 22 0.3 55 0.9 8 0.6 0 0.0 
Denmark 2 <0.1 16 0.3 1 0.1 0 0.0 
Spain 4 0.1 3 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
France 16 0.2 4 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
United 
Kingdom 2,022 27.5 2,844 49.0 862 68.3 61 42.1 
Germany 12 0.2 22 0.4 3 0.2 0 0.0 
Ireland 45 0.6 105 1.8 3 0.2 0 0.0 
Mexico 3 <0.1 0 0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Norway 0 0.0 49 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
New Zealand 555 7.5 432 7.4 24 1.9 6 4.1 
Portugal 44 0.6 58 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Sweden 11 0.1 10 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
United States 1,950 26.6 829 14.3 150 11.9 40 27.6 
TOTAL 7,355 100.0 5,806 100.0 1,265 100.0 145 100.0 
Source: Compiled from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Health Workforce and 
Migration Data at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,3746,en_2649_37407_36506543_1_1_1_37407,00.html  
 
3.2.7 In summary, the African diaspora in South Africa and the South African diaspora outside 
Africa display distinctive and different characteristics. Table 11 summarizes the major 
differences in terms of overall sociodemographic profile, migration type, spatial distribution, 
behaviour, degree of integration in destination countries, and remitting behavior (the subject of 
the next section). This comparative typology is a useful precursor to a discussion of diaspora 
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engagement since different types of diasporas have different potentials and propensities for 
involvement in development activities that benefit their countries of origin. 
 
 
Table 11: Comparing the Diasporas 
 South African Diaspora Outside 
Africa 
African Diaspora in South 
Africa 
Sociodemographic profile White (> 80%), family, skilled, tertiary 
educated, professional, 
Black (> 80%), individual (75% 
male), all skill levels and all 
education levels 
Main migration type Permanent Temporary, circular, transnational 
Spatial distribution Concentrated in 6 countries From 50 African countries but 
majority (90%) from the Southern 
African Development Community 
Integration High economic and social integration 
High rates of permanent residence and 
citizenship 
Qualifications recognized 
Low integration and high barriers 
to permanent residence and 
citizenship  High levels of 
discrimination and xenophobia 
Deskilling common 
Remittances Low in comparison to income High in comparison to income 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
4.0 Forms of Diaspora Engagement 
4.1 The division into distinct periods of South Africa’s global diasporic dispersal in the 
previous section is important because the character of actual and potential diaspora engagement 
differs for each group of immigrants. Engagement interest is relatively high among many pre-
1990 emigrants who have risen to positions of professional prominence and economic power and 
maintain a strong interest in the development of a democratic South Africa. The second group 
(the migrants of the 1990s) are the least likely to engage, since they left precisely because they 
objected to the transformation in South Africa and are extremely critical of and negative about 
their country of origin. The third group, the post-2000 migrants, retain the strongest personal ties 
with South Africa and are generally less enamored with their countries of destination. They are 
aware of the enormous social and economic challenges that South Africa faces, have a modicum 
of guilt about their personal reasons for leaving, and retain an interest in events there. This group 
displays high use of social networking sites and organizes cultural nostalgia events. 
 
4.2 As a country of migrant origin and destination, South Africa both sends and receives 
remittances. World Bank calculations suggest that both flows have been increasing in recent 
years, although the outflow is larger than the inflow. There have been no studies of the remitting 
behavior of the South African diaspora abroad. Little is known about who remits, how the 
remittances are sent, who they are sent to, and how they are spent. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that a main motivation for personal remitting is to support elderly parents and relatives who 
16 | P a g e  
 
remain in South Africa.31 There also appears to be a considerable amount of investment in real 
estate, but how much of the country’s sizable inward flows of foreign investment is motivated or 
catalyzed by diaspora individuals or companies is unclear. 
 
4.3 The most common form of engagement by the diaspora abroad appears to be tourism and 
the nostalgia trade. Many South Africans in all of the major destination countries make regular 
return trips to visit the country, family, and friends. The nostalgia trade is partly responsible for 
the worldwide diffusion and adoption of products such as South African wine and the ubiquitous 
rooibos tea. Diaspora-owned companies in all the major destination countries import South 
African products and African crafts for sale to the diaspora and more broadly. Other common 
forms of diaspora engagement include support for charities and nongovernmental organizations, 
involvement in aid programs, and political activities (such as voting in elections). 
 
4.4 Much more is known about the remitting behaviour of the African diaspora in South 
Africa.32 The Southern African Migration Programme’s study of five sending countries found 
that 84 percent of migrant-sending households receive regular remittances from South Africa 
(compared with only 7 percent that receive income from agriculture). Remittances (cash plus 
goods) are the most important source of household income. Around 60 percent of remitting 
migrants remit at least monthly and 95 percent remit annually while 80 percent use informal 
channels. The amount remitted varies with marital status, age, gender, occupation, and skill 
level. 
 
4.5 Remittances are spent primarily on household needs—food, clothing, school fees and 
transportation (Table 12). Over 80 percent of household expenditures in most livelihood 
categories are met from remittances. The “development impact” of remittances is therefore 
primarily related to securing household food security and educating children. The expenditure of 
remittances does benefit informal sector traders and small, medium, and micro enterprises, but 
the primary beneficiaries of food purchase are increasingly South-African-owned supermarket 
chains in origin countries. Levels of investment, savings, and business development from 
remittances are generally low. Little is invested in agricultural production. The question of how 
to enhance the development uses and impacts of sizable remittance flows has received little 
attention. 
 
Table 12: Use of Remittances in Countries of Origin* 
Expenditure category Number of households Percent 
Food 3,297 81.9 
School fees 2,106 52.3 
Clothing 2,101 52.2 
Fares (bus, taxi) 1,361 33.8 
Seed 968 24.0 
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Fertilizer 613 15.2 
Tractor 549 13.6 
Savings 503 12.5 
Cement 448 11.1 
Funeral 434 10.8 
Funeral and burial policies 393 9.8 
Roofing 301 7.5 
Doors and windows 284 7.1 
Bricks 279 6.9 
Cooking fuel 240 6.0 
Labor 221 5.5 
Cattle purchase 187 4.6 
Repay loans 168 4.2 
Marriage 150 3.7 
Purchase goods for sale  147 3.7 
Small stock purchase 146 3.6 
Feast 139 3.5 
Walls 142 3.5 
Other building material 121 3.0 
Paint 108 2.7 
Dipping /veterinary costs 106 2.6 
Oxen for ploughing 97 2.4 
Vehicle purchase/maintenance 98 2.4 
Poultry purchase 92 2.3 
Insurance policies 87 2.2 
Wood 89 2.2 
Vehicle/transport costs 73 1.8 
Other special events 45 1.1 
Equipment 39 1.0 
Labor costs 40 1.0 
Other business expenses 24 0.6 
Other farm input 23 0.6 
Other personal investment 25 0.6 
Machinery/equipment 18 0.4 
Other transport expenses 17 0.4 
Source: Southern African Migration Program 2005; http://www.queensu.ca/samp. 
Note: *Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zimbabwe. 
  
4.6 Both diasporas are involved in various forms of associational activity with a focus on 
their home countries. In South Africa, these range from forms of political organization and 
activism (in the case of Zimbabweans in South Africa), to home cultural associations 
(particularly common among migrants from West and Francophone Africa in South Africa), and 
informal migrant mutual help groups such as burial associations and savings and credit groups. 
Migrant social networks are particularly strong in helping new migrants find accommodations 
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and employment and, given the general xenophobic atmosphere in South Africa, provide 
migrants with solidarity and physical protection. 
 
4.7 The South African diaspora abroad is considerably more dispersed, and associational life 
generally takes the form of cultural associations with only limited development engagement with 
South Africa. However, there are important diaspora development-oriented organizations and 
networks—such as the African Diaspora Network and the Nelson Mandela Children’s 
Foundation in Canada—in which South Africans play a prominent role. Elite knowledge 
networks have also begun to emerge in the diaspora. The first and potentially most innovative of 
these, the South African Network of Skills Abroad, has received much positive attention in the 
literature but failed to deliver on its promise to mobilize the diaspora to address South Africa’s 
skills shortages. A more recent initiative is the Global South Africans network (which describes 
itself as a “brain bank of the 1,000 or so best and brightest minds”), which aims to mobilize 
South Africans in positions of power and influence for investment and skills development in 
South Africa.33 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
 
5.1 A strong case can be made for expanding the definition of the “African diaspora” to 
include migrants within Africa itself. However, as this paper has shown with regard to South 
Africa, there are significant differences between the diasporas within and outside of Africa. This 
means that the nature of their contribution to the development of their home countries also 
varies. The argument has often been made that the “creation” of a South African diaspora abroad 
has been driven by the labor needs of major western countries and has had very negative 
development consequences for South Africa itself.  In recognition of this, the South African 
government developed a new skills-based immigration policy in the form of the Immigration Act 
of 2002. Growing African migration to South Africa has undoubtedly mitigated some of the 
negative impacts of the South African brain drain.  
 
5.2 The contribution of the diaspora in South Africa to the development of their countries of 
origin is clearly sizable. The Lesotho and Mozambique economies would be hard-pressed to 
even exist without migration and remittances.34 Households with migrants have much better 
development outcomes in both countries than those that do not. Zimbabwe’s economic collapse 
would have happened much sooner and would have been far more devastating but for the 
massive flow of remittances across the border from South Africa.35 Remittances and return 
migration will continue to play a key role in the reconstruction and rebuilding of the country. 
The potential contributions of diaspora engagement to South African development need further 
research. Indeed, the new research agenda identified in this chapter should provide invaluable 
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evidence on how the contributions of both diasporas can be maximized in the interest of those 
who cannot or choose not to move but to remain. 
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